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Iran's gas shortage spirals out of control amidst electricity crisis

Dalga Khatinoglu
Dalga Khatinoglu

Oil, gas and Iran economic analyst

Aug 3, 2024, 12:10 GMT+1Updated: 16:14 GMT+0

Iran's summer power crisis, which cut electricity to industries by half and caused widespread blackouts, has now led to urgent warnings about a severe gas shortage this winter.

As Iran’s gas demand is expected to soar to two billion cubic meters per day over the next 15 years, Manouchehr Daftarian, head of the Iranian Gas Engineering Association, has urged the Supreme National Security Council to address the current gas imbalance. He warns that if this issue is not resolved promptly, the country will face severe and unmanageable challenges.

During the summer, Iran faces a 14,000-megawatt (MW) electricity shortage, while in the winter, it struggles with a daily gas deficit of 250 million cubic meters (Mcm/d). These shortages cost the country's industries at least $8 billion annually.

Iran's gas supply/demand by 2040 (Million m3/day)
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While Iran ranks second after Russia in terms of gas reserves, holding 34 trillion cubic meters, it has not developed new fields. Additionally, its largest gas-producing field, South Pars, has experienced a pressure drop and a decline in productivity.

Iran's annual gas demand has risen from 153 bcm in 2013 to 245 bcm in 2023, reflecting a 7% annual increase over the past decade. The residential sector and power plants have driven much of this growth and are expected to continue showing strong consumption increases through 2040.

A gas production platform in the Persian Gulf South Pars field
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A gas production platform in the Persian Gulf South Pars field

Due to the lack of growth in renewable energy, the extent of electricity and gas shortages in Iran has spread to all seasons in recent years. The peak of the electricity imbalance, however, occurs in the summer, while the peak of the gas shortage happens in the winter.

Daftarian has also warned that unless gas consumption is halved, the imbalance will not be resolved in the coming years.

“This winter, there is currently a gas imbalance of about 250 mcm/d. The issue is that our problem is not just now. In 2027, even with enhanced energy consumption, the gas demand will be 1,500 mcm/d, but the government will only be able to supply 400 mcm/d,” he recently said.

In January, the National Development Fund (NDF) of Iran also predicted that by 2040, the country's gas production would only be able to meet "one-third" of domestic demand.

According to its estimates, domestic gas demand in Iran will nearly double by 2040, reaching over 1.4 bcm/d, while production levels are expected to almost halve, dropping below 493 mcm/d. Additionally, the NDF projects that the greatest growth in gas demand will occur in the residential and power generation sectors.

The Research Center of the Iranian Parliament published a similar report last summer, indicating that in addition to the 250 mcm/d gas shortage in winter, there are shortages in other seasons as well. Overall, the average gas imbalance throughout the year is about 123 mcm/d, and it is projected to peak at 460 mcm/d by 2040.

Why is Iran's gas production declining?

About three-fourths of Iran’s gas is produced from the South Pars field, which is shared with Qatar. According to Iran's Ministry of Petroleum, this field has entered its second half-life since last year, and with the ongoing pressure drop, gas production from South Pars will decrease by 10 bcm per year starting this year.

This decline will significantly impact Iran's overall gas production and contribute to the growing energy shortage in the country.

In contrast, Qatar began gas production from this shared field 10 years earlier than Iran and has already produced 2.8 trillion cubic meters of commercial gas (pure methane) from it.

An Iranian gas processing plant on the Persian Gulf coast. Undated
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An Iranian gas processing plant on the Persian Gulf coast

Iran claims to have produced two trillion cubic meters of "raw" gas from South Pars so far, although it is not precisely clear how much of this produced gas is pure methane and how much consists of other impurities such as water and heavy gasses.

Years ago, Qatar addressed the pressure drop issue in this field by installing 20,000-ton platforms, which are 15 times larger than those on the Iranian side of South Pars, and are capable of carrying massive compressors. Since 2022, Qatar has signed a $29 billion contract with global oil giants, aiming to increase gas production from this field by 35% within the next three years and by approximately 60% by 2030.

Following the JCPOA, known as the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran signed a $5 billion contract with a consortium led by French company Total for the development of Phase 11 of South Pars. Half of the contract amount was allocated for constructing a 20,000-ton platform equipped with two massive compressors.

After the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Total pulled out of the project, and the Chinese partner, CNPC, also abandoned it shortly thereafter. The technology for constructing these facilities is exclusively held by a few Western companies.

South Pars accounts for over 40% of Iran’s gas reserves, and while the Islamic Republic could somewhat increase its gas production by developing new fields, the investment in the upstream oil and gas sector has been insufficient. Over the past few years, the average annual investment in this sector in Iran has only been $3 billion, which is half of what it was in the early years of the previous decade and one-seventh of the 2000s.

Additionally, 80% of Iran’s active oil fields are in their second half-life and lose 8 to 12% of their production annually. The government's current focus is on developing new oil fields to prevent a decline in crude oil production and exports, leaving gas projects as a lower priority.

According to the World Bank, Iran flared 20.4 billion cubic meters of gas last year. The International Energy Agency estimates methane leakage from gas facilities in Iran at 8 billion cubic meters annually.

In the grand scheme of things, Iran would need just around $5 billion to stop flaring and a few billion more to halt methane leaks. The government, however, has not deemed this a priority amidst the country’s financial crisis and budget deficit.

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Iran hypes retaliation threat; US bolsters regional military presence

Aug 3, 2024, 10:55 GMT+1
•
Niloufar Goudarzi

Iranian media and some officials have intensified rhetoric about retaliating against Israel for the Hamas leader's killing in Tehran as the US bolsters its military presence in the region.

During a live broadcast on Tehran's possible response on Friday night, an Iranian state TV anchor declared, "In the coming hours, the world will witness extraordinary scenes and significant developments."

Nour News, a media outlet close to Iran's Supreme National Security Council, posted on its X social media account near midnight on Friday, using the hashtags #RevengeForGuest and #IsmailHaniyeh: "A punitive operation against the Israeli regime will be carried out at a determined time and manner."

The X account of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has pinned a tweet that says, "The fall of the Zionist regime [Israel] is inevitable."

This type of psychological warfare, prevalent in Iranian media since Haniyeh's death, suggests there would be a significant response to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh on Wednesday in Tehran, as well as the killing of Tehran-backed Hezbollah's senior military commander, Fuad Shukr in an Israeli airstrike on a Beirut suburb a day earlier.

Despite the absence of comprehensive or transparent reports from Iranian domestic media and official sources regarding the circumstances of Ismail Haniyeh's death, there is a concerted effort to vociferously proclaim imminent retribution, asserting that an Iranian assault on Israel is inevitable within the coming hours and days.

The Iranian media, engaging in strategic ambiguity regarding the timing, emphasizes that the forthcoming action will surpass the previous offensive in scale and impact.

On April 13, Iran initiated a significant offensive, launching a barrage of over 300 missiles and drones at Israel, citing retaliation for Israel's purportedly lethal strike on its embassy compound in Damascus on April 1.

While almost all these projectiles were intercepted and neutralized, hardline factions assert that this forthcoming assault will be markedly more severe.

On Saturday, Kayhan, the most hardline newspaper in Tehran, stated, "Iran has advanced significantly over the past five months, and the retribution against the Zionists will be more multifaceted, coordinated, and severe this time."

The paper, funded by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reported that unlike Iran's April operation against Israel, which targeted only a few bases outside Israeli cities, the upcoming operation would target areas deep inside Israel, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa, strategic centers, and the residences of Israeli officials involved in killing Haniyeh. This assertion was made in Kayhan's Saturday editorial, managed by Khamenei's representative.

In Tehran's imminent retaliatory operation against Israel, the article added, long-range and precision missiles and drones will be among the options. However, unlike the April attack on Israel, the possibilities will likely not be limited to two or three types of missiles and drones launched from miles away and only from Iran.

Kayhan emphasized that in the upcoming operation, the Islamic Republic's military should consider "painful human casualties" in addition to causing strategic damage. According to Kayhan, Israeli ships traveling from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea will also be targeted with heavy attacks, presumably bu Iran's Houthi proxies in Yemen, and Israel's economic targets will not be immune to military strikes.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon announced on Friday that the US military will deploy additional fighter jets and Navy warships to the Middle East. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has approved the deployment of additional Navy cruisers and destroyers, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, to both the Middle East and Europe. Furthermore, an additional squadron of fighter jets will be dispatched to the Middle East.

The Pentagon indicated plans to enhance readiness for deploying more land-based ballistic missile defenses. This strategic move follows intensified US military deployments before Iran's April 13 attack on Israeli territory.

Analysts, however, caution that if Hezbollah joins forces with Iran, it could complicate interception efforts. The threat from Hezbollah in Lebanon, with its extensive arsenal and proximity to Israel, presents unique challenges for US efforts to intercept drones and missiles.

What role will Zarif play as Pezeshkian’s strategic deputy?

Aug 3, 2024, 07:10 GMT+1
•
Majid Mohammadi

Despite former Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif's prior announcement that he would not hold a position in the Pezeshkian administration, he was appointed deputy for strategic affairs to the new president.

What is the capacity of this newly created position? What is Zarif's agenda in this context, and what goals will he pursue? Based on what has been said and published in Iran so far, Zarif's most likely role will be to lead influence campaigns in the West.

Deputy, adviser, or head of a study center?
The text of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s appointment letter draws multiple roles for Zarif. As the President’s deputy, Zarif will hold a portfolio equivalent to those overseeing executive, parliamentary, legal, and Sunni affairs, or similar to positions like the heads of the Atomic Energy Organization, the Management and Planning Organization, or the Environmental Protection Organization. While these organizations are not ministries, they function at a comparable level.
At the same time, Zarif is expected to advise the head of the executive branch on strategic matters. His role includes: "Leveraging the accumulated experience of the country's senior managers over the past decades and the extensive expertise of elites from think tanks and civil society institutions.” The president also noted that Zarif is “expected to monitor major domestic and international developments, assess the success in achieving the goals of the constitution, the vision document, and the general policies approved by the Supreme Leader, and report directly to me." Zarif himself acknowledges this advisory role.
Another role assigned to Zarif is to preside over a research institute. According to Pezeshkian’s letter, Zarif is tasked with "taking over the responsibility of the Presidential Strategic Research Center and transforming its missions and functions into a suitable organization for the President’s deputyship." The Presidential Strategic Research Center, part of the Iranian Presidential Institution, serves as a think tank for the administration, conducting strategic and inter-institutional studies, reviews, and research. It is responsible for introducing plans and proposals related to national strategies in political, economic, social, and cultural fields, in line with the general policies of the system.

This strategic deputy position was specifically created for Mohammad Javad Zarif, as it did not previously exist within the organizational structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.


Zarif's agenda
Zarif has clearly outlined the mission of this new deputy position: "No new bureaucracy or mechanisms will be created, there will be no burden on the government's budget or the people's table; no interference with existing operations; no diminishing the functions of any organization; and the role will serve as a bridge between the government, the people, think tanks, and civil institutions."

Zarif will not establish new organizations and will have an office within the presidential building. He will continue the role he played during Pezeshkian’s campaign and in the appointment of ministers: mobilizing and promoting Pezeshkian’s agenda. His job is to help the president navigate among existing power structures; a role similar to what he held as foreign minister. Additionally, in situations where the president is sidelined, Zarif will find ways to maneuver between political, security, and military forces, as he did when dealing with the notorious Qasem Soleimani, the IRGC, and the Supreme Leader’s office, to avoid becoming irrelevant.

The idea of connecting the government with the people and civil institutions seems far-fetched, as Zarif operates within the hardcore of power and has never engaged with independent civil society institutions in Iran.

Zarif's capabilities
Zarif lacks significant influence within the country, aside from a few experts at the Institute for Political and International Studies, an entity affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the senior staff of the Ministry. His real strength lies in the network he has cultivated abroad. During his decade-long stay in New York as Iran's representative at the United Nations and his 8 years as Foreign Minister, Zarif developed an extensive network of foreign contacts that Pezeshkian needs. Despite opposition from some in the parliament and the IRGC, Pezeshkian must bear the cost of maintaining Zarif's cooperation.
Zarif is a valuable partner for cooperation, often praised by a network of Iranian and non-Iranian forces in the media, think tanks, and foreign ministries in Western countries. He can shape narratives and provide analysis that aligns with the goals of Pezeshkian or the Leader’s office during critical periods. Holding a government position also shields him from suspicions of unauthorized cooperation with foreign governments, a serious legal charge in Iran. Over his eight years as Foreign Minister, Zarif demonstrated a high capacity for disinformation, outright lies, and propaganda aimed at influencing public opinion in the West.

An investigative report by Iran International and Semafor in 2023, revealed that during Zarif’s tenure as foreign minister, the Islamic Republic was able to create the Iran Experts Initiative in the United States in mid-2010s, to influence American policy centers and the US government. The operation was led and coordinated by officials working for Zarif.

A group of experts were tasked to write articles and opinion pieces, for example, that aimed to defend Tehran’s position on major issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions.

In a recent example, after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, individuals known for defending pro-Tehran positions in the West framed his assassination as a setback to the peace process and the pursuit of a ceasefire. This narrative, which aligns with the views of the Biden administration and some European countries, is used by the Islamic Republic of Iran to portray Israel as the aggressor. Zarif can focus on coordinating and amplifying these types of influence activities.

PODCAST: Iranian insider likely to be behind the killing of Hamas leader

Aug 3, 2024, 00:17 GMT+1

An Australian-British academic who was falsely imprisoned in Iran under espionage charges said the hit on Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh likely came from an Iranian insider.

After attending a conference she was invited to in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2018, Dr. Kylie Moore-Gilbert was arrested by the intelligence arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and eventually sentenced to 10 years in prison on charges of espionage.

Two years later, she was released in exchange for three convicted Iranian terrorists connected to a bomb plot in Bangkok in 2012.

During her time in Iran's notorious Evin prison she learned to speak Farsi and came into contact with high-level IRGC and state officials.

On this week's episode of 'Eye for Iran', Moore- Gilbert opens up about her time in prison and explains why she believes there was likely an Iranian insider behind the suspected Israeli hit, as Iran reels in the wake of Ismail Haniyeh's assassination.

Speaking to host Negar Mojtahedi, Moore-Gilbert also shares what she learned about her captors and what that means about the state of mind of high ranking government officials in this week's episode of 'Eye for Iran.'

You can watch the entire episode on Iran International's YouTubePage or listen to it on Spotify, Apple or Amazon.

People in Tehran fear the drumbeats of war with Israel

Aug 2, 2024, 23:04 GMT+1

The morning Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran felt eerily similar to the morning Qasem Soleimani was assassinated. We woke up, picked up our phones, and read the news in shock. We imagined the worst—war. The anxiety was there, but not as intense as the last time.

It was unclear what had caused Haniyeh’s death. “A projectile,” they said. But how? What type? From where? We didn’t know. We weren’t even sure where his residence was. Some said it was the Saadabad Palace, adding to the creeping anxiety. What if the Palace, a historic landmark, was damaged?

It was just too much. A friend wrote that he had diarrhea from the shock and stress. The fear of war looming –again. Not as intense as the fear we had when Soleimani was killed, but a gut-churning fear nevertheless.

The difference this time was that it wasn’t the first time. We had seen it before: the cries of retaliation, the promise of Harsh Revenge. Only in April, we felt we had to brace for a full-blown war after Israel hit Iran’s consulate in Syria. But the full-blown war never came. Missiles were launched; missiles were intercepted; and life went on as ‘normal’. The utter madness that is our normal in Iran.

So now, many Iranians simply joke away the bellicosity. It’s a defense mechanism that seems to work –until it doesn’t.

"Wars start with smaller clashes., with skirmishes. We all know that.” Masoud is 49 and works as a clerk for an organization half owned by the state. He thinks the younger generation should take the wisdom of his generation more seriously. “One side strikes, the other responds, and this tit-for-tat continues until it reaches a point where it can no longer be stopped. And that would be a dark day for all of us.” Those who remember the eight-year horror of the war with Iraq are often more cautious when discussing the prospect of another one. “I don’t like this regime either, but when I hear talks of an attack overthrowing the ‘system’ but not harming the people, I dread their naivety."

Rally in Tehran following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh
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Rally in Tehran following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh

This may be a common line of argument among the older generation. But it’s by no means universal. In fact, some of the more radical voices you get to hear around you are that of the ‘fed-up’ elderly: pensioners like Mahmoud, who have “seen it all”, and cannot help letting out a Persian proverb every other sentence.

“Die once, mourn once,” he says, holding up his index finger to illustrate ‘once’. "We cannot go on forever with this government. It’s been oppressing us and destabilizing the region for years. We have no effective opposition. The only option left is to target their bases and erase them from the face of earth without harming civilians."

Few speak publicly in favor of foreign military intervention. But those few may now cite the “surgical elimination” of Haniyeh –as does Mahmoud– as “evidence” that the Islamic Republic can be “taken out cleanly”, and we should therefore not fear a Syria-fication of Iran. This, as far as I can tell, is still a minority, if not fringe, view. But it also looks as if the ‘targeted assassinations’ –from Soleimani to [Iran’s nuclear mastermind Mohsen] Fakhrizadeh, and now Haniyeh– may have emboldened a few more Iranians to casually call for such actions.

The day after Haniyeh was killed, I overheard a conversation in a grocery store that illustrates this sentiment brilliantly. A middle-aged woman was complaining about the constant rise of prices. "Forty thousand tomans [$0.70] for a 100gr pack of butter?” she exclaimed. “It’s gone up because of the killing [of Haniyeh]. It’ll go higher with the next one,” the grocer said. “The next one is the main one, God willing,” the woman replied. The grocer reminded her that such words could cause her trouble. There was no need to explain further. We all knew who she meant by the ‘main one’, a term used for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The assassination, like many other events, one has to admit, has led to a wave of conspiracy theories. “It's not that they can't kill Iran’s leaders, they don’t want to,” a friend said after I told her about the exchange in the grocery store. “They need the Islamic Republic to be there as the scarecrow of the region."

And then there are those who see the Haniyeh assassination as proof that Israel could have eliminated Hamas with much less civilian casualties if it wanted to. Sohrab, a graduate student in social sciences, is one such voice. “They killed ten of thousands in Gaza under the pretext that Hamas uses civilians as human shields, claiming they had no choice,” he says.. “But we just saw how easily they can hit their target without harming a single civilian. I think the killings in Gaza are more deliberate than they’d like to admit."

The past year or two has been crazy even by Iran’s standards. The current Iranian calendar year is not even past the halfway mark, and we’ve had a president killed in a helicopter crash and a top figure in the Axis of Resistance assassinated in Tehran. After Raisi’s death, the Persian social media turned into a river of jokes. That has not been the case this time. Perhaps because the former was an entirely domestic affair. No one feared a war to break out. This time, the drum beats are constant and loud. “The world will witness our power –and soon enough,” an official just said on the state TV.

Still –and as far as I can tell– few are as scared as they were when Soleimani was killed. But it’s tense. We’re all waiting to see how the Harsh Revenge pans out this time. Most concerned are those with tickets for air travel –and those whose loved ones are supposed to fly in for a long-anticipated, short summer vacation. This shouldn’t be the ‘normal’ life for anyone. It is here, though, and there’s very little we can do about it.

Iran expels Afghan researcher over hijab ‘non-compliance’

Aug 2, 2024, 22:20 GMT+1

Iranian authorities have expelled Kobra Gholami, an outspoken Afghan social researcher, allegedly for failing to comply with the country's mandatory hijab regulations.

Reports indicate that, despite possessing valid residency documents, Gholami received multiple text message warnings regarding her hijab before being summoned to the passport office, where she was detained by Iranian police and deported within hours.

The people close to her contend that her expulsion lacked legal justification and that she was denied the opportunity to communicate with her family.

Her deportation has ignited a social media firestorm amid Iran's ongoing crackdown on women over mandatory hijab.

Users have launched a campaign with the hashtag "#BringBackKobra," voicing concerns about her fate in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and advocating for her return to Iran.

Shima Va’ezi, an Iranian social media user, drew attention to Gholami's abrupt deportation on X, stating, "Kobra is now on the bus and hasn't had the chance to speak to or say goodbye to her family and loved ones. She possessed all the necessary residency documents and was pursuing a master's degree at Al-Zahra University."

On Thursday, Ameneh Zamani, a child rights activist briefly detained in 2022, wrote on her Instagram account that Gholami recently delivered a speech in Iran titled "Identity Formation of Migrant Women at the Intersection of Gender and Nationality."

Describing Gholami as a "strong and independent" woman, Zamani wrote: "All of us women dream of living in a world of freedom. Let's be Kobra’s voice! As Kobra said, 'Hope is the seed of our identity.'"

Last year, Gholami spoke at the sixth conference on Social-Cultural Research in Iran, under the theme "Femininity and Social-Cultural Transformation," in a panel titled "Afghan Migrant Women in the Cycle of Oppression," where she criticized the treatment of Afghan migrant women in Iran.

Afghans constitute the majority of immigrants in Iran, both legal and illegal, and are frequently labeled as "foreign nationals" by officials and the media. Currently, officials estimate the number of Afghan immigrants in Iran to be as high as 8 million.

International human rights organizations have recorded years of mistreatment of Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran as they continue to be deprived of many essential services, including healthcare, employment opportunities, and housing. However, a large influx since the 2021 takeover of the Taliban has led to some backlash by Iranians who say their country has multiple serious economic and social crises and cannot handle refugees.

According to Afghan authorities, Iran deported over 20,000 Afghan children last year, many of whom were unaccompanied and without guardians.